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Since 1992 the European Commission has been in search of an ‘open and structured 
dialogue with special interest groups’ (Official Journal, 1993, p.2).  The structured 
dialogue is as much for the benefit of EU institutions as it is a means for outside 
interests to engage with them, providing a plurality of technical and political 
information, a reservoir of potential allies to achieve the goals of different EU 
institutions viz. each other and with member states, and some degree of refuge from 
populist criticism about a dialogue with lobby groups and their representatives (see 
Freeman and Dolan, this volume). In 2001, it became cast more widely as a dialogue 
with ‘civil society’ as a means to provide greater legitimacy to EU policy-making 
(European Commission, 2001).  A search for legitimacy for the technical content of 
policy (‘output legitimacy’) and by way of participation in the formulation of policy 
(‘input’ legitimacy) has led to the design of a series of procedures (‘throughput 
legitimacy’; Schmidt, 2012) to structure this dialogue (see also Kröger, this volume).  
The procedures anticipate engagement in the dialogue primarily by organisations, 
underpinned by incentivised transparency mechanisms.  Collectively, the various 
procedures for an open and structured dialogue help to provide EU institutions with a 
‘market place of ideas’ from which to choose for policy making purposes, as well as 
the means to identify and select allies during the course of legislative proposals.  EU 
institutions also utilise advocacy organisations as an ‘unofficial opposition’ (see Cann 
and da Silva, this volume) in a political system which is otherwise highly focused on 
consensus building. 
 
Organised civil society in the form of advocacy organisations are frequently 
used by international organisations as the best available proxy for an otherwise 
disengaged civil society, because of the absence or weakness of mechanisms linking 
their political institutions directly to civil society. At EU level, citizens are linked to 
EU decision making indirectly through their elected governments in the Council of 
Ministers, and directly through the European Parliament (EP).  The limitations of the 
direct linkage is reflected in voting turnout in EP elections, with the last two each 
producing an average turnout close to 43% (including countries with compulsory 
voting).  The absence of a European ‘demos’, or public space, is held to originate in 
the absence of a common language, media (Scharpf, 1998 in van de Steeg, 2010), or 
recognisable political parties, and no system of government and opposition.  These 
structural limitations mean that EU institutions, like other international organisations 
sharing similar constraints, use organised interests as the best available proxy for civil 
society, with a nucleus satelliting around the EU institutions in Brussels (the ‘Brussels 
bubble’), but with procedures increasingly cast at securing wider participation.  There 
is a debate as to whether these procedures simulate political competition and 
contestation by a wide range of participants, or constrain civil society organisations 
by forcing them to operate within the confines of EU institutions (Kohler Koch, 
2012).  In this latter view, contestation provides the essence of politics, whereas the 
inward looking, consensus orientation of decision making in international 
organisations (around 80% of the Commission’s legislative proposals become law – 
Woll, 2012) make them unsuited in principle to democratic legitimacy (Kohler Koch, 
2012).  Kohler Koch is also critical of the elite nature of EU professionalised lobby 
groups and the uneven nature of political participation which hardly provides for 
equal citizen participation, as well as finding patchy implementation of procedures for 
participation (Kohler Koch & Quittkat, 2013).  Others who share the perspective of 
the importance of contestation find it present in the growing engagement of social 
movements outside of the ‘Brussels bubble’ in EU legislative files (Crespy, 2014; Dür 
and Mateo, 2014; Leiren & Parks, 2014; Parks, 2014; see also Eliasson, this volume).  
There are also contentious organisations operating within the Brussels bubble, such as 
the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) (see Cann and da Silva, this volume), 
sharing back-office facilities with other like-minded organisations in an eco-building 
‘palace of protest,’ a short walk away from the European Parliament, with an 
atmosphere reminiscent of a ‘well run student union’ (Ariès & Panichi, 2015).  
Campaigns related to internet freedom have notably involved social movements 
utilising online campaigning skills, extending far beyond the ‘Brussels bubble’.  
 
Whilst the total population of organisations seeking to influence the public 
policy of EU institutions, and the number of individuals involved, can never be 
known with any precision, the EU Transparency Register contains almost 10,000 
organisations across the globe which have chosen to make an entry (two-thirds of 
which identify ‘European’ as their level of organisation – Greenwood & Dreger, 
2013), including over 6,000 individuals with accreditation to access the European 
Parliament on a regular basis.  The register contains different sections for: 
consultancies; law firms; business associations; companies; trade unions; Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs); think tanks and related organisations; religious 
organisations; and regional authorities, public and mixed entities. The Transparency 
Register is described in further detail later in this chapter. 
 
The fragmented nature of EU decision making provides for a naturally 
pluralistic environment.  The diversity of each of the three main legislative bodies 
insulates EU decision making from ‘regulatory capture’, with 28 member states, 8 
political parties in the European Parliament (EP), and over 30 different departments 
(Directorates General) in the European Commission.  In consequence, this breadth 
requires the formation of broadly based alliances and platforms from civil society 
organisations (see the chapters by von Westernhagen, and Stachowicz, this volume).  
The Marine Stewardship Council is an example of a common platform (in this case 
between Unilever and the Worldwide Fund for Nature ((WWF)) providing 
certification for products drawn from sustainable fisheries, helping to position a 
multinational company with fish food branded products as part of the solution rather 
than part of the problem.  The diversity of EU decision making requires any single 
interest to dilute its demands in a consensus orientated system.  Klüver et al find that 
the size of lobbying coalitions is a good predictor of interest group success, with 
broadly based large coalitions enjoying an advantage (Klüver, Braun and Beyers 
2015).  NGOs, in particular, act in coalition, often with success in influencing policy 
outcomes by politicising issues and bringing them to a wider audience, as described 
later in this chapter. 
 
 
The Dialogue Procedures 
 
The dialogue procedures emerged from a bifocal process in 2001.  One was a drive 
for ‘better regulation’, spearheaded by the high level Mandelkern Report with its 
critique of the quality of policy outputs from the European Commission (Mandelkern 
Report, 2001). The second was the Commission’s own White Paper on Governance in 
the same year, with its emphasis on input (participative) legitimacy.  These two 
strands remain prominent to the present, although commentators differ as to where the 
emphasis most lies.  The quality and significance of the procedures which developed 
following these measures is the subject of debate in the literature on interest 
representation.     
 
Funding 
Funding by EU institutions makes it possible for a wide variety of interests 
from civil society to maintain professionalised organisations in Brussels geared to 
dialogue with them, providing a plurality of presence.  Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) s in receipt of EU grants receive an average of 43% of their 
income in this way (Greenwood and Dreger, 2013).  Many of the core European 
umbrella groups, such as the Platform of European Social NGOs (‘Social Platform’), 
as well as those in the fields of homelessness and public health, are the direct result of 
intervention by EU institutions in search of informed dialogue partners, and allies for 
regulatory legislative initiatives (Kohler Koch, 2012).  The Social Platform receives 
over 80% of its income from an EU grant. 
 
Recipients differ in the way they perceive their EU funding (Jacquot and 
Vitale, 2014).  Thus, the European Women’s Lobby (funded almost 80% by the 
European Commission) has taken a policy decision not to take disputes with the 
European Commission to court, whereas the European Environmental Bureau (funded 
around 40% by an EU grant) have taken contention with the Commission to law 
(Sanchez Salgado, 2014; see also Buijink, this volume).  Larger global brand NGOs, 
such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace, have taken policy decisions not to 
seek EU funding on the grounds that it might be perceived to compromise their 
independence. A counter example is provided by Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) 
who received over €6million in EU funding in 2014, and yet any cursory glance at its 
websitei reveals substantial contention of EU policy making.  Transparency 
International (TI), similarly, have used EU funding to conduct and disseminate reports 
and activities which are highly critical of EU institutions (Transparency International, 
2015; see also Freeman and Dolan, this volume).  Highly contentious organisations, 
such as the CEO, have successfully accessed alternative sizeable sources of 
independent funding from trust foundations.   
 
The search for legislative allies intensified when the agenda of the European 
Commission shifted during the 1990s and beyond from an earlier period of market-
making to a new epoch of market regulating (Dür, Bernhagen & Marshall, 2015).  
Regulating markets required the Commission to make common cause with supporters 
for its measures to counter-mobilise against business opposition to legislative 
proposals expressed through member state governments in the Council of Ministers.  
Regulatory proposals are likely to produce competitive interest group politics (Young, 
2010), either between NGOs and business, or between and within these segments and 
sectors.  For instance, regulation of vehicle emissions by standard setting will divide 
car component suppliers (with the technology to produce parts which meet high 
standards) from car manufacturers (seeking to contain costs), and manufacturers of 
large vehicles (challenged by high standards) from smaller and less polluting vehicles.  
These differences can come down to the level of the individual firm producing 
different types of cars (see also Clarat, this volume), and products.  For instance, IBM 
found that one of its product divisions used open-source software whilst another used 
proprietary software, making it unable to reach a common position on a legislative 
proposal aimed at making patenting of software easier (Gehlen, 2006).  Where a firm, 
or industry segment, is able to reach a common position which is consistent with that 
of an EU legislative institution, so alliances will result.  These shifting sands of 
politics provide for a much more nuanced understanding of EU politics compared to 
caricatures which treat business or NGOs as if they were a homogenous and unified 
entity. Boräng and Naurin find that 
 
“The common picture of Brussels – and in particular the Commission – of being 
in the hands of big business is not confirmed by this study.  On the contrary, 
civil society actors are more likely to share views with the Commission officials 
of what is at stake in legislation compared to business.  When competition is 
low, and a few business actors get to dominate the process and the media, the 
odds get to even out between the two types of actors” (Boräng and Naurin, 
2015, p.514). 
Funding thus provides the EU institutions with a ready network of supporters 
for legislative purposes. 
 
Transparency 
Transparency regimes vary between access to documentation from EU 
political institutions, to the transparency of lobbying organisations and their 
interaction with EU institutions, and transparency in the use of expertise. 
(i) Access to Documents 
The EU Access to Documents regime also dates from 2001, providing for access to a 
wide range of documents (including emails), subject to certain exceptions (such as, 
inter alia, maintaining the integrity of inspections, audits and investigations).  In 
2014, the European Commission received 6227 requests for access, making a full 
disclosure in 73% of cases and part disclosure of a further 15% (and subsequently 
one-fifth of these were fully disclosed on appeal) (European Commission, 2015; see 
also Kröger, this volume).  Dissatisfied applicants can use the appeals procedure, and 
beyond that complain to the European Ombudsman (see Gadesmann, this volume) or 
pursue a case in the European Court of Justice.  The process is highly politicised, 
including an NGO (Access Info Europe) dedicated to the cause and an accompanying 
website to facilitate requests and publish the information obtained, and other activist 
NGOs (including Transparency International and the CEO) which have made 
common cause with an activist Ombudsman as a source of pressure to gradually 
expand the release of documents over time.   
 
(ii) The Transparency Register 
The Register is for groups and organisations with whom EU institutions interact, 
aiming to provide public information as to what interests are being represented at EU 
level, who is representing them and through which outlets, what legislative files are 
being addressed, and how much is spent in the process. Organisations publish an entry 
themselves on the register, and agree to be bound by an obligatory code of conduct 
(see Grad and Frischhut, this volume) in order to be included.  The Joint Transparency 
Register Secretariat (JTRS) of the European Commission and European Parliament 
oversees the register and makes random checks on data as well as unusual entries and 
data ranges, but in practice much of the monitoring of the register is undertaken by 
‘watchdog’ NGOs such as Transparency International (TI) (see Freeman and Dolan, 
this volume) and the CEO, together with the media outlet Politico with its specialist 
Brussels Influence newsletter.  Inclusion in the register is incentivised by measures 
such as a pre-condition to meet with a Commissioner or their cabinet, or a Director 
General of a Commission service.  TI have a dedicated website, EU Integrity Watch, 
which records these meetings from the declarations made by those inside the 
Commission.  In this way, there are regulatory measures to cover the activities of both 
the lobbied and lobbyists. Other registration incentives for lobbyists include the 
possibility for a one-year accreditation to the European Parliament (EP) for a day-pass 
to the premises (making it easier to reach lobbying targets), access to speaking 
positions in EP hearings, and to the European Commission’s expert groups, described 
below. 
 
The novel feature of the register is its breadth of scope, taking in  
 
“activities carried out with the objective of directly or indirectly influencing the 
formulation or implementation of policy and decision-making processes of the 
EU institutions…irrespective of where they are undertaken and the channel or 
medium of communication used” (Inter Institutional Agreement, para 7; my 
emphasis). 
 
This breadth of scope helps to explain the quantity of registrations, as well as the 
information made public.  With the notable exception of law firms, watchdog groups 
now find it hard to identify any entity which is regularly lobbying EU institutions and 
has no entry on the register.  Law firms have historically used ‘client confidentiality’ 
as cover not to register as to do so involves disclosure of clients as well as their 
activities, providing them with a competitive advantage in attracting clients, but even 
this is now eroding as some national law societies are removing this objection, and 
some law firms breaking ranks and making a registration.  The emphasis of watchdog 
organisations has shifted to the quality of data in the register (see Freeman and Dolan, 
this volume), and to extending sanctioning mechanisms which currently rely on 
reputational measures such as suspension from the register and withdrawal of the pass 
to the EP.  A parallel focus involves measures aimed at the lobbied, and in particular 
the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon (see Cann and da Silva, this volume).  There are 
currently restrictions on Commissioners taking up positions within 18 months of 
taking office, and upon senior officials for 24 months extending to 36 months for 
activities covering their former service.  The restrictions on former MEPs are less 
strict in recognition of electoral fortunes, with a lobbying position resulting in a loss 
of privileges in using the facilities of the EP which former MEPs are otherwise 
entitled to.  The Ombudsman has also been active on lobby regulation measures, 
working with NGOs to expand the sphere of regulation (Panichi, 2015; see also 
Gadesmann, this volume).  The case for a mandatory transparency register is made by 
Krajewski in this volume. 
 
Consultation 
The European Commission publishes an annual Commission Legislative Work 
Programme (CLWP) which alerts stakeholders to an upcoming consultation, and 
provides a ‘consultation road map’ as an integrated component of impact assessments.  
All Commission legislative proposals and major policy initiatives carry the 
requirement to publish an integrated Impact Assessment, in which consultation forms 
a compulsory embedded component, to conform with a set of standards embedded in 
‘soft law’ (Smismans and Minto, 2016).  A Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) 
oversees impact assessments, with powers to require unsatisfactory consultations to 
be changed.  The European Ombudsman forms a further independent measure of 
oversight (Smismans and Minto, 2016). The European Commission’s Your Voice in 
Europe portal is an open consultation outlet for new policy initiatives, publicly open 
for 12 weeks for commentary.  After the 12 weeks, the Commission rounds up the 
policy responses with an analysis document, and listing the respondents.  Mostly, the 
topics are highly specialised, resulting in a limited number of responses from 
organisations with technical expertise.  There is some patchiness as to the production 
of these reports (Kohler Koch & Quittkat, 2013), making accountability difficult.   
 
Some topics for consultation reach a wider public, stimulated by activist 
organisations providing template responses through online submission portals.  
Activist organisations play a key role in politicising issues, using powerful frames to 
simplify technical issues (Boräng and Naurin, 2015).  The European Commission’s 
public consultation on the Investor State Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ISDS) of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) produced almost 150,000 
responses (see Eliasson, this volume).  The extent of pressure in some member states, 
notably Germany and France, has politicised TTIP to the point of senior politicians 
announcing the end of the trade deal at the time of writing (von der Burchard, 2016).  
NGOs also politicised the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) to such an 
extent as to defeat the measure in the European Parliament after the EP had initially 
been minded to pass the measure, presenting frames suggesting that sharing music 
files between friends would be criminalised (Dür and Mateo, 2014).  And in August 
2016, open internet campaigners heralded a major triumph after an EU regulatory 
body took measures to protect net neutrality, prohibiting Internet Service Providers 
from blocking or changing the speed of services except under strictly defined 
conditions (Toor, 2016).  Campaigners used their professionalised online skills to 
attract an EU record of 480,000 responses to the consultation by the Body of 
European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC).  TTIP/ISDS and net 
neutrality provide powerful examples of the ways in which NGOs and Social 
Movements can mobilise support and channel it into EU protest using established 
consultation procedures for ‘an open and structured dialogue’ with civil society, 
achieving their intended results. 
 
Organisations with something to say on a consultation topic, either as a core 
stakeholder or with an unusual position, often get selected to make a presentation in a 
second phase of public meeting consultation (Broscheid and Coen, 2007). There are 
differences between the Commission services as to how this second tier of dialogue is 
organised, as well as different perceptions between institutions and societal actors as 
to the purpose of consultative meetings, summed up in evaluation reports as ‘A Voice 
but not a Vote’ (ECORYS, 2007; Iusman and Boswell, 2016). 
 
Expertise 
The definitive study on the use of expert groups made by the European Commission is 
provided by Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2015), who found that around 40% (500) of the 
Commission’s advisory groups featured societal actors, with the remainder 
comprising national ministries and agencies.  Of these, business actors were present in 
29% of groups and NGOs in 28% of groups, leading them to conclude that   
 
“the overall pattern of inclusion/exclusion of societal actors are partly consistent 
with a norm of participatory diversity & representation of heterogeneous 
interests and perspectives…business interests are more often than not matched 
and mixed with other non-governmental actors” (p.161). 
 
 
Taken together, these procedures are designed to provide ‘an open and structured 
dialogue’ between EU institutions and outside interests.  They are constitutionalised 
by Article 11 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which records (my emphasis) that  
 
• The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their 
views in all areas of Union action. 
• The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
their representative associations and civil society. 
• The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in 
order to ensure that Union action is coherent & transparent. 
 
Article 11 also introduced a new component, the European Citizens’ Initiative, in 
which one million signatories collected within 12 months and drawn from one-quarter 
of member states (with country quotas by size) can request the European Commission 
to bring forward a legislative proposal on a subject covered by the EU Treaties, 
reinforced with a hearing in the Parliament to the response of the European 
Commission.  Thus, it is an agenda-setting measure; whilst the signature collection 
threshold has proved too challenging for most initiatives, it has served to diversify the 
range of issues brought to EU institutions by civil society (Bouza Garcia and 
Greenwood, 2014), and brought campaigning away from Brussels and into the 
member states (Greenwood and Tuokko, 2016).  Often, interests follow policy 
initiatives introduced by the European Commission, and thus the ECI provides an 
institutionalised reverse mechanism. 
 
Conclusions 
Taken as a whole, there is a recognisably pluralistic dimension to the interests 
represented at EU level.  The fragmented nature of EU decision making already 
provides a degree of insulation from pressure by any one type of interest, and this 
pluralism is reinforced by procedures for the representation of a diverse set of 
interests at EU level, with interests represented in an open public arena.  Whilst there 
are provisions for the European Commission to be answerable for the policy choices it 
makes on the basis of policy inputs it received, there is unevenness to the extent that it 
follows accountability arrangements.  Nonetheless, NGOs have stimulated the 
responsiveness of EU institutions where they have been able to raise the saliency of 
an issue, such that the European Parliament will take up the cause in an effort to 
demonstrate its legitimacy as the people’s tribune.  In a striking analysis of 70 
legislative files, Dür et al find that business actors are less successful than citizen 
actors in EU policy making, particularly where NGOs have succeeded in raising the 
saliency of an issue to the point that the European Parliament takes up the cause (Dür 
Bernhagen & Marshall, 2015) (see also Marshall, this volume).  Thus, interest group 
type matters; these authors found that business interests are only successful where 
conflict is low and issues remain technical and below the radar of public saliency to 
the EP, a finding echoed by others (Boräng and Naurin, 2015).  Klüver et al also place 
emphasis upon the salience and complexity of an issue in determining interest group 
activities, as well as factors such as whether a change to the status quo is involved, 
policy type (regulatory policies producing competitive interest group politics), and the 
size of lobbying coalitions (Klüver, Braun & Beyers, 2015).  These contextual factors 
help to produce a far more nuanced account of EU interest representation than a focus 
upon resources, or treatment of ‘business’ as if it were a homogenous actor.  The 
procedures to structure dialogue between EU institutions and civil society reinforce an 
essentially pluralistic system in which EU decision making is highly fragmented.  
There may be implementation deficits in some of the procedures – most notably the 
answerability of the Commission to consultation results – but this is part of a system 
in which EU institutions dominate the policy-making process, insulating themselves 
from pressure by outside interests, or carefully selecting alliance partners to achieve 
their policy goals.  In this open and structured dialogue, input is a ‘voice but not a 
vote.’  The procedures are a work in progress, but since their introduction from 2001 
there have been incremental improvements to throughput legitimacy as a result of 
internal evaluations (Kröger, this volume) and external (Ombudsman, NGOs) 
watchdogs.  They provide for an elite dialogue between EU institutions and largely 
Brussels based organisations, but in an environment where NGOs can raise the 
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